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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WILFORD M. BURTON, Trustee,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Involuntary plaintiff, respondent,
and defendant,

Case No.

vs.

12,917

WILLARD ROGERS, ARLENE
ROGERS, his wife, WILLARD D.
ROGERS, Jr.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND TO
THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF UTAH:
Come now the petitioners, Willard Rogers, Arlene
Rogers, his wife, and Willard D. Rogers, Jr., Defendants
and Appellants, and hereby respectfully request a rehearing in the above entitled cause and that the decision
and opinion of this Honorable Court filed herein on
March 6, 1973 be modified, reversed as hereinafter suggested for the reasons, and upon the grounds following,
to-wit:
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POINT I - THE COURT ERRED IN ITS DECISION nr
INTERPRETING THE MEANING OF CONTRACT
(EXHIBIT 29-D):
(a) THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN ITS INTER.

PRETATION OF THE PHRASE "AS EXCLUDED
HEREINABOVE," AS EXCEPTING THE PROPER.
TY CLAIMED BY APPELLANTS HEREIN.

(b) THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF
THE CONTRACT WORDING RESULTS IN A
"HARSH" DETERMINATION OF THE APPEL.
LANTS' RIGHTS.
( c) WHERE ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF

THE MEANING OF CONTRACTUAL RELATION.
SHIPS ARE PRESENT, THE SIMPLER, LESS IN.
VOLVED, AND MOST STRAIGHTFORWARD INTERPRETATION SHOULD PREVAIL; RATHER
THAN A STRAINED INTERPRET ATI ON.

(d) THE COURT SHOULD GIVE MEANINGFUL
WEIGHT TO EACH PARAGRAPH OF THE AGREE·
MENT, RATHER THAN MAKING THE INTER·
PRETATION TURN ON A SINGLE PARAGRAPH
OF THE CONTRACT.
(e) THE COURT RESOLVES THE CONTRACTUAL

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS
THOUGH IT WERE THE SITUATION BETWEEN
TWO CONTRACTING PARTIES, WHEREAS RE·
SPONDENTS HERE ARE STRANGERS TO THE
CONTRACT.

(f) THE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO GIVE
WEIGHT TO THE MEANING OF THE CONTRACT
AS PLACED THEREON BY THE PARTIES THERE·
TO THEMSELVES.
(g) THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "EXEMPTED" AND

"RESERVED" IS NOT WELL TAKEN HERE, SINCE
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THE WORDS (ALTHOUGH TECHNICALLY DIFFERENT) NEVERTHELESS THROUGH USAGE
HAVE BECOME PRACTICALLY INTERCHANGEABLE.
POINT II - THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO DETERMINE WHETHER RESPONDENT BURTON
HAD (A) ANY TITLE TO SUSTAIN HIS CLAIM AS
A TITLEHOLDER OR OBLIGOR HEREIN OR (B)
WHETHER THE UNITED STATES TAKING THROUGH
BURTON AND THE DEFICIENT DEEDS TO HIM
HAD ANY STATUS AS TITLEHOLDERS TO BRING
THIS ACTION.
POINT III - SITUATION RESULTING FROM THE
COURT'S DECISION MAY BE PRODUCTIVE OF FURTHER LITIGATION, RATHER THAN FIXING TITLE
IN THE PARTIES AS A FINALITY.

WHEREFORE, petitioners respectfully submit that
a rehearing should be had and that the aforesaid decision and opinion of this Honorable Court be vacated
and revised in accordance with the principles hereinabove set forth, believing that a re-examination of the
record, made by this Honorable Court after a rehearing,
wherein counsel will be able to assist the Court to examine the totality of issue and in the record certified,
which will result in a revision and reversal of the decision
herein and see that a miscarriage of justice will not result.
Dated this 26th day of March, 1973.
RICHARD S. JOHNSON
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS

Attorneys for Petitioners,
Willard Rogers, Arlene Rogers,
his wife and Willard B. Rogers,
Defendants and Appellants
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IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS' BRIEF
FOR REHEARING
POINT I (a)
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRE.
TATION OF THE PHRASE, "AS EXCLUDED HEREIN.
ABOVE," AS EXCEPTING THE PROPERTY CLAIMED BY
THE APPELLANTS HEREIN.

It is well settled that the interpretation of the meaning of a provision in a contract must be correlated to he
entire contract, and not considered as an isolated item.
See:
(i) Vitagraph Inc. v. American Theatre Co., 71
Utah 71 (page 79), 291 Pac. 303, where the
court says:
"Every word in the agreemnt must be taken
to have been used for a purpose, and no word
should be rejected as mere surplusage if the
court can discover any reasonable purpose thereof
which can be gathered from the whole instrument."
(ii) Vulcan Steel Corporation vs. Markosian, 23
Utah 2d 287, 462 Pac 2d 166, where the
Court used the folowing wording:
"In interpreting a contract, the primary rule
is to determine what the parties intended by what
they said. The Court may not add, ignore or dis·
card words in the process, but attempts to render
certain the meaning of the provision in dispute
by an objective and reasonable construction of
the whole contract."
(iii) Cornwall vs. Willow Creek Country Club, a
corporation, 13 Utah 2nd 160, 369 Pac 2nd
928 which is in accord with and in the same
'
language
as in the quote above.
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(iv) Continental Bank & Trust Co. vs. Bybee, 6
Utah 2nd 98, 306 Pac 2nd 773, where the
rule is set out as:
"/1-4/ The sole question ... is whether the
parties intended . . . that respondent should assume the obligation on the note .... This intent
should be ascertained first from the four comers
of the instrument itself, ... "
The net result of the court's determination may be
summed up in saying that the items listed in the contract
as being subject to conveyance by "quit-claim" deed
are non-existant, and hence, of no effect. This does violence to the language of the contract by striking, in effect,
the commitment to convey certain portions of he desscribed property by quit-claim deed.
Furthermore, to read into the commitment to convey
certain properties by quit-claim deed, the exceptions
made to the warranty deed is fallacious, since (a) The
items to be conveyed by quit-claim include properties not
covered by the warranty deed (and hence its exceptions),
and (b) would be superfluous by requiring both warranty and quit-claim deeds to the same properties.
Furthermore, the Court has erroneously interpreted
the word "as" as a synonym for "subject to," a meaning
which is both novel and unwarranted. It is clear that
the meaning intended for "As" in this contract is that
of "because," "since," "it being the case," or "which" Black's Law Dictionary at page 145 of the 9th Edition
states:
" ... It may also have the meaning of 'because,'
'since,' 'or it being the case' ... "
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In the case of State vs. Rudman, 136 Atl. 817 (Maine
1927), the word "as" was given the meaning of "be'.
cause" in the phrase "unless the same was done as necessary for the preservation of the mother's life . . . . " In
the same case at page 819, it is stated:
"/8/ In the plain meaning of the words of th 1
statute our conclusion is verified. An accepted
meaning of the conjunctive 'as' is 'because,' 'it be.
ing the case that.' Webster's New Int. Dictionary.
If substitution be made and the statute read 'unless
the same was done 'because' or 'since it was' (or)
'it being the case that it was necessary' no ambiguity remains; - the legislative intent is clear.''
In the case of Kelley vs. Peterson, 2 N.W. 346 (Nebraska) 1879, the court held that the word "as" in the
phrase "the defendant refused and neglected to cut plain·
tiff's wheat as defendant had agreed and contracted"
means "who" or "which.''

The phrase "as excepted hereinabove" thus mearu
"which (were) excepted hereinabove" relating to the
mining claims to be "deeded by quit-claim, 'because'
I
they were excepted from the conveyance by warranty ·
deed," or "since" they were so excepted above, or, "it ·
being the case that 'they were excepted above.'" This
interpretation gives meaning to the whole phraseology
and is consistent with the purpose and intent of the i
whole contract, which is the necessary determination to
be made to correlate all the terms of that document
without expunging extensive parts of the "quitclaimed"
area<; from the operation of the sale agreement.
1

1
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POINT I (b)
THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONTRACT WORDING RESULTS IN A "HARSH" DETERMINATION OF THE APPELLANTS' RIGHTS.

It has been variously stated that a "harsh" result is

to be avoided.

See: "Harsh and repugnant interpretations of
written instrument are not looked upon with
favor."-M assachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co.
v. Concrete Steel & Bridge Co., C.C.A. W.Va.,
37 Fed 2nd 695.
"Where strict construction would make contract
unreasonable it will be construed liberally.-Raw
Silk Trading Co. v. Katz, 194 N.Y.S. 638, 201
App. Div. 713.
"Presumptions: ( 1 ) It is presumed that parties
intended to make a reasonable and rational contract.-Lowery v. May, 104 So. 5, 213 Ala. 66.
" ( 2) Only the terms they employ can invite
or justify a conclusion to the contrary. Burton v.
Steverson, 91 So. 74, 206 Ala. 508.
" ( 3) Contracting parties usually engage on
rational considerations and to reasonable effects
and ends, and when the courts find it necessary
to construe instruments of obligation, it is ever
proper and often essential for them to assume, at
least prima facie, that the unreasonable and irrationable was not the contractual intent. Smith
Sons Lumber Co. vs. Steiner, Crum & Well, 85
So. 758, 20 4Ala. 306."
To interpret the contractual provisions involved here
as intending to incorporate the exclusions to the warranty items, would not only as hereinabove set out be
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causing both warranty and quit-claim conveyances to the
same properties, an unthinkable redundancy, but, also
result in, as construed in the opinion of the Court, a total
elimination of property to be conveyed by quit-claim
and leave the appellants with no claim to title whatso.
ever on the property listed to be quit-claimed by the
sellers, as relates to this lawsuit.

I

And the word "as" in the exclusion clause should be
read "being the property excepted above," (referring
to that to be conveyed by warranty), not all the exceptions to the warranty items themselves.
It is clear that the property to be conveyed by the
warranty deed applies only to the mining claims excluding metes and bounds description claimed by Burton.
but as to the excess to quit claim all other interest in the
said mining claims.
POINT I (c)
WHERE ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
MEANING OF CONTRACTURAL RELATIONSHIPS ARE
PRESENT, THE SIMPLER, LESS INVOLVED, AND MOST
STRAIGHTFORWARD INTERPRETATION SHOULD PRE·
VAIL, RATHER THAN A STRAINED INTERPRETATION.

"The construction of a written contract or any
other instrument should be broad enough to allow
it to operate fairly and justly under all the condi·
tions to which it may apply, and a court will not
place an unjust construction upon a contract un·
less it is compelled to do so by the terms of the
instrument. A construction which is just and fair
to both parties will be preferred to one which is
unjust or unfair, and a contract will not be con·
strued so as to render it oppressive or inequitable
as to either party, or so as to place one of the
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parties at the mercy of the other, unless it is clear
that such was their intention at the time the contract was made. The inconvenience, hardship, or
absurdity of one construction of a contract or its
contradiction of the general purpose of the contract is weighty evidence that such meaning was
not intended where the language is open to a construction which is neither absurd nor frivolous
and is in agreement with the general purpose of
the parties.-Section 252, Contracts, 17 A.J. 2d,
Page 644.
"As a general rule, contracts should be liberally construed so as to give them effect and carry
out the intention of the parties. To this end, a
liberal construction will be given to the words,
either singly or in connection with the subject
matter. A literal or technical construction of an
isolated or special clause should not be indulged
to defeat the true meaning of a contract, which
is to be determined from all of its provisions.
Where it is plain that a strict and literal construction of a contract does not convey the real meaning of the parties, such construction should not
be entertained."-Section 253, Contracts, 17 A.J.
2d, p. 646.
An interpretation of the contract (Exhibit 29-D),
which leaves property to be conveyed by quit-claim,
rather than eliminating it is in accord with spirit and
intent of the contract, and is the interpretation to be
desired, rather than a strict, strained, and highly technical construction of an isolated phrase as the governing
point in the desideratum. By eliminating the property
for which a ppelants bargained for in their contract, and
inserted in their agreement to be conveyed by quit-claim
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deed, there is resort to a construction not intended or
countenanced by law and equity.
It should not be assumed that the parties intended
to delete all the property the Supreme Court's opinion
says is excluded, by means of an obscure and difficult
and controversial phraseology, when a reasonable reading of the clause as it exists would indicate otherwise.
and the exclusion could have been accomplished by siinpler and more direct phraseology.
The properties to be conveyed by quit-claim deed,
include East half of the Alton, George Lode South of
Silver Lake #3, and East half of Silver Lake #1. The
only portion of the above claims which might conflict
with the respondents' claimed interest is the area in the
East half of the Alton claim. Since the other claims, as
first listed, were to be conveyed by warranty deed there
was no need to include them, but, it was the intent of
the parties to convey by quit-claim the excluded ground
in the warranty deed class. The only reason for including
the same claims in the quit-claim category was to assure
conveyance by quit-claim of the exceptions to the war·
ranty deed.
The Court's decision and opinion herein, in effect,
has the parties saying that in the warranty deed class,
there are certain conflicts, which are excepted from the
warranties, and, they are likewise to be included in the
quit-claim class, subject to the same exceptions. Whv
convey by quit-claim with the same exceptions? No mean·
ingful result would be obtained by the Court's theory, ,
whereas, the clear and obvious intent of the parties was
1
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except only the parts of the claims above conveyed
bv the warranty.
to

To further illustrate, the West half of the Alton claim
is covered by the call for a warranty deed in the first
listing of properties to be conveyed, and so when the
entire Alton is mentioned in the quit-claim deed (in
fact to cover the East half of the Alton claim), but, if
the property excluded in the warranty section is also by
the Court's interpretation excluded from the quit-claim
category, then it may be noted that the effect is to add
the East half of the Alton claim, which, by the exclusion
as read by the Court, becomes immediately again excepted, which results in a futile, superfluous and useless
set of gestures, which type of construction is under the
foregoing authorities to be avoided.
POINT I (d)
THE COURT SHOULD GIVE MEANINGFUL WEIGHT
TO EACH PARAGRAPH OF THE AGREEMENT, RATHER
THAN MAKING THE INTERPRETATION TURN ON A
SINGLE PARA GRAPH OF THE CONTRACT.

This rule is universally stated in approximately the
language of this point.
Besides the "description" paragraph, there are other
items of the contract which are worthy of consideration,
and apparently overlooked. Paragraph Six of the contract (Exhibit 29-D) should be noted in this context:
"Seller shall furnish to Buyer marketable title
to said premises by Warranty deed, except as to
those portions to be conveyed by quit-claim deed
as first hereinabove stated, said premises to be
free and clear of encumbrances save and except
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the following:" (Patent reservations), (Subject
(Subject to mineral rights), (Sub.
Ject to p1pelme easement), (Exceptions in an Act
of Congress) .
Certainly these exclusions are "normal" exclusions,
and they do not purport to exclude the "exceptions as
above," and when read with the quit-claim provision on
the 1st and 2nd pages of the sales agreement, are perfectly sound and sensible exceptions. Certainly, if the
exceptions mentioned exclude the title to the ground,
or portions of it, excepted from the warranty, there
would as to the ground here in dispute be an interpretation that would be senseless as eliminating any meaning for the clause, and read in conjunction, with the
exceptions normal to such transfers as set out in para·
graph sixth, it would make sense, instead of senselessnes.1
by eliminating from operation of the quit-claim provision the items listed as includable therein, per the con·
tract [Exhibit 29-D J.
POINT I (e)
THE COURT RESOLVES THE CONTRACTURAL RE·
LATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS THOUGH IT
WERE THE SITUATION BETWEEN TWO CONTRACTING
PARTIES, WHEREAS RESPONDENTS HERE ARE STRAN- '
GERS TO THE CONTRACT.
II

Note that the interpretation adopted by the respond·
ents relative to the meaning of the exclusion clause on
page 2 of the Real Estate Sales Contract (Exhibit 29-D. ,
page 2), is NOT one raised by a party to the contract.
the parties evidently having adopted the construction
claimed in appelant's brief (Point VIII, Pages 25, 26,
27, 28) being in agreement, and their understanding was
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being caried out by the sellers and the escrow agent in
making deeds to the escrow agent as trustee. [Exhibits
39-D, page 45; Exhibit 40-D, Page 39; Exhibit 41-D,
Page 30; Proposed Exhibits 49-D, 50-D.]
Certainly, it is hardly justifiable to say that third
parties may claim a relatively greater advantage under
a contract than the contracting parties themselves placed
upon the relevant language.
POINT I (f)
THE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO GIVE WEIGHT

TO THE MEANING OF THE CONTRACT AS PLACED

THEREON BY THE PARTIES THERETO THEMSELVES.

Continuing further, the total factors involved in construing the contract as a whole, attention of the Supreme
Court is invited to paragraph Tenth of the Real Estate
Contract, which provides for conveyance of the property
to Security Title Company as Escrow Agent to hold as
security during the time of the purchase money payments.
The deed given to Security Title wtih "warranties"
is in accordance with the warranty agreement part of
the title arrangement set out on the first page of the
agreement. [See Exhibits 39-D, page 45; 40-D, page 39;
41-D, page 30] recorded December 29, 1961.
Likewise the "copy" of partially completed quit-claim
deed, proferred in evidence but erroneously not admitted,
[Exhibits 49-D, 50-D] contains a description just the
same as the contract description of items to be conveyed
by quit-claim, giving meaningful construction to the intent of the parties in connection with this contract, and,
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not subject to the strained construction contended for bv
the respondents.
·
See Hardinge Co., Inc. vs. Eimco Corporation, 266
Pac. 2d 494, 1 Utah 2nd 320, where the Court points out:
" . . . Further in the interpretation of contracts.
the interpretation given by the parties themselves
as shown by their acts will be adopted by the
Court. 3 Williston, Contracts, Sec. 623."
POINT I (g)
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "EXEMPTED" AND
"RESERVED" IS NOT WELL TAKEN HERE, SINCE THE
WORDS
(ALTHOUGH TECHNICALLY DIFFERENT!.
NEVERTHELESS THROUGH USAGE HAVE BECOME
PRACTICALLY INTERCHANGEABLE.

Though the words "exempted" and "reserved" originally had different technical meanings, the words arr
often now interchangeably used, and the Courts to effectuate the results intended by the parties, construe them
to mean what was necessary to carry out the intention
of the parties, rather than to make the technical differ·
ences vitiate the real desires of the parties to an instru·
ment.
See such cases as .Martin vs. Cook, 60 N orthwestem,
679, 680, 102 Mich. 267, where the Court said:
" ... yet in order to effectuate the intention of the
grantor, such a reservation has been treated as
excepting from the grant the thing reserved."
Hence, by substituting the meaning "exempt" for
"reserve" in paragraph seventh of the said contract, it
becomes clear that the parties intended to convey all of
the premises described in the contract.

!
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The Court's interpretation rests upon an overly technical distrinction between an "exception" and a "reser\'ation" and then says that the language in the contract
concerning reservations refers only to that part of the
contract not excluded. As has been observed, the terms
"reservation" and "exception" are generally used interchangeably, and in this sense, the parties have in effect
stated it is not the intent of the seller to exclude any part
of the property (meaning that all of the property is to
be conveyed by a combination of warranty deed or by
quit-claim deed). Further there is no need for a provision
in a contract constituting a covenant that nothing shall
be reserved. It is axiomatic that an agreement to convey a certain tract constitutes a covenant to convey all
of the interest which the sellers have. It adds nothing
to say, "I agree to sell," and "I covenant not to reserve
anything." The only reason for getting into the subject
of reservations at all is to clarify that the sellers are
going to convey all the interest which they have. The
record of this action clearly shows that the sellers had an
interest in the contested property by chain of title and
by adverse possession. This is also borne out by the fact
that sellers didn't bother to defend the first quiet title
action, having thought they had disposed of their interest.
By its construction, the court allows sellers to retain this
interest (subject to buyers' equitable right for reformaI tion, perhaps) although they agreed otherwise, and then
presumably the Court's decision lets it be cut off by the
first quiet title action or at least necessitates further litigation. This is not an equitable or economical result.
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POINT II
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DE
TERMINE WHETHER RESPONDENT BURTON HAD (A
ANY TITLE TO SUSTAIN HIS CLAIM AS A TITLE HOLD.
ER OR OBLIGOR HEREIN, OR (B) WHETHER THE
UNITED STATES TAKING THROUGH BURTON AND
THE DEFICIENT DEEDS TO HIM, HAD ANY STATUS
AS TITLEHOLDERS TO BRING THIS ACTION.

It is evident, without again setting forth the detail
included in Point I (that respondents are not record
title holders entitled to maintain an action to quiet titleTitle in Predecessor Lakewood Farms due to defiicent
deeds.) of Appellants' Brief herein, pages 5 and 6, and
related matters.

If, in fact, the deeds from Lakewood Farm to Burton
as trustee are not entitled to be recorded, and, if the1
are not for that reason to be binding upon appellants,
or so a matter of record as to be notice to appellants of
transfer of title, there would seem to be no proper vestige
of title with respondents upon which to base their claim
to status to maintain this action, and, irrespective of any
claims by or for them, no proper party here to maintain
any action. This is in effect a procedural ruling which
should be made before a substantive ruling which the
Court makes by its opinion filed herein.
POINT III
SITUATION RES UL TING FROM SUPREME COURT'S
DECISION MAY BE PRODUCTIVE OF FURTHER LIT!·
CATION RATHER THAN FIXING TITLE IN THE PAR·
TIES AS, A FINALITY.

1

The net result of the Court's decision is to say that i
the appellants have no title to the ground supposed to ,
be conveyed by quit-claim as per the original sales agree·
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ment (Exhibit 29-D). Now let us see where this leaves
the parties: The appellants if the contract was under
the erroneous interpretation futile to convey the lands
in question would then in theory be able to obtain from
the sellers under that contract further indicia of title,
and, the parties are then back in almost the same position
as they were initially, and the same issues would arise
as were presented in appellants' brief and reply brief,
leaving the problems still unsolved, as this litigation is
not conclusive on the matter except as to the possible
interpretation of the contract.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
RICHARD S. JOHNSON
Attorneys for Defendants,
Appellants, Rogers

